Security
Last updated: October 31, 2026
LifeOS holds some of the most personal things people write down, so it's built so that we can't read them. This page explains how, what we're still working on, and how to tell us if you find a problem.
How your data is protected
- End-to-end encryption. Everything is encrypted in your browser with AES-256-GCM using a random data key. That key is stored on our servers only in wrapped form: once with a key derived from your password (PBKDF2-SHA256, 600,000 rounds) and once with your recovery key.
- We never see your password. Sign-in uses a separate value derived from it, so our servers can't derive your data key.
- Attachments are encrypted with the same data key before upload and stored as unreadable blobs.
- Shared spaces each have their own key, wrapped to every member's public key (ECDH P-256). Invite links carry their secret in the part of the URL that's never sent to a server. Removing someone rotates the key. Members can compare a safety code to rule out a swapped key.
- Trip links are encrypted in your browser with a fresh random key before upload. The key sits in the part of the link after the # (never sent to a server), so we store only ciphertext. Anyone who has the whole link can read the parts you ticked — costs, confirmation numbers, booking links and notes are never included — and you can stop sharing at any time, which deletes our copy.
- Emergency access seals your data key to your trusted contact's public key. It's released only after they request it and your waiting period passes without you denying it.
- Passkey unlock uses the WebAuthn PRF extension. The data key is wrapped with a secret only your passkey can produce, and that wrapped copy never leaves your device.
- Account protection: optional two-step login (authenticator app), auto-lock (7 days by default, adjustable), a list of signed-in devices, a security log and "sign out everywhere". Row-level security in the database means each account can only reach its own rows.
- The site itself: a strict Content Security Policy with no third-party scripts, analytics or ads, HSTS, and no framing. The one exception is Plaid Link, which loads only on the app page and only when you choose to connect a bank.
What isn't end-to-end encrypted
- Your email address, billing status and sign-in metadata.
- That a trip link exists, when it was last updated and when it expires (not what's in it), and the size of its encrypted copy.
- The calendar feed, if you turn it on, because other calendar apps have to read it. It's off by default and shows "busy" blocks only unless you choose otherwise.
- Task blocks and synced calendar events, if you connect Google or Outlook and turn them on. They pass through our server only to reach your calendar (not stored or logged), and then live in your Google or Microsoft calendar, outside Life OS's encryption. By default a task block says "Focus time" and shows you as free; task names are opt-in. The sync reads those blocks back so that moving one there moves the task.
- Calendly bookings and Slack posts, if you connect them. Bookings are read only and pass through our server to reach your device (not stored or logged), then live in your end-to-end encrypted data. Slack posts are built on your device from what you ticked and say only that something is ready unless you choose counts or titles; the server escapes them and sends them to your channel. The Calendly sign-in token and the Slack posting address stay on the server and are never sent to the app.
- Reminder times for closed-app notifications (never what they're for), and who is a member of which shared space.
Known limits
- Your password is your encryption key. We can't reset it for you. If you lose it and your recovery key, your data can't be recovered. Keep the recovery key somewhere safe and offline, and make an encrypted backup now and then.
- A compromised server could hand back an older copy of your data. A device that already has newer data keeps it; version history under Settings → Data safety lets you restore.
- The page allows inline script, so a cross-site scripting bug would be serious. We escape everything, sanitise synced and shared data, and block links that would run code; a stricter policy needs a larger rewrite.
- Staying unlocked on a device keeps a non-extractable key in that browser for 7 days of inactivity by default. You can shorten it (down to 30 minutes) or turn it off per device under Account. Lock the app on shared computers.
Independent audit
We plan to commission an independent review of the encryption design and code and to publish the full report here. It hasn't happened yet, and we won't claim it has until the report is up. The design and the browser code that runs it are readable by anyone in the app's source.
Report a vulnerability
Email bradyfitllc@gmail.com with "LifeOS security report" in the subject. Please include steps to reproduce and what an attacker could achieve. We'll reply within 3 business days, keep you updated, and credit you here if you'd like.
Ground rules
- Only test against accounts you own. Never access, change or delete other people's data.
- No denial-of-service, spam, social engineering or physical attacks, and no automated scanning that degrades the service.
- Give us reasonable time to fix an issue before you disclose it publicly.
- Out of scope: missing best-practice headers with no real impact, self-XSS, rate limits on non-sensitive actions, and issues in third-party services (report those to them).
If you follow these rules, we won't pursue or support legal action against you for your research.